UIC Law Review
Volume 46

Issue 2

Article 3

2013

A Requiem for Protest: Anglo-American Perspectives on Protest
Post-9/11, 46 J. Marshall L. Rev. 455 (2013)
Christopher Newman

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, European Law Commons, First
Amendment Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace Commons

Recommended Citation
Christopher Newman, A Requiem for Protest: Anglo-American Perspectives on Protest Post-9/11, 46 J.
Marshall L. Rev. 455 (2013)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol46/iss2/3
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more
information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

Do Not Delete

3/12/2013 6:46 PM

A REQUIEM FOR PROTEST: ANGLOAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON PROTEST
POST-9/11
CHRISTOPHER J. NEWMAN*
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is axiomatic to suggest that the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001 in the U.S. and the subsequent War on
Terror1 have had a “profound impact upon civil liberties and civil
rights,” specifically within England and Wales and the U.S..2
Much has been made of the repeated challenges to threats to
liberty,3 the rule of law,4 and other such weighty constitutional
issues. While there has been some discussion of protest, the focus,
understandably, tends towards mass protest rather than on
developments within the low-level public order law.5 This
* Dr. Christopher J. Newman, BA (Hons), PG Dip Law, PG Dip Legal
Practice, PhD, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Sunderland. Email
chris.newman@sunderland.ac.uk
1. Oliver Burkeman, Obama Administration Says Goodbye to ‘War on
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
25,
2009),
Terror’,
THE
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/25/obama-war-terror-overseascontingency-operations. The scope of the War on Terror was made explicit in
the speech made by President George W. Bush on May 1, 2003. In a speech
delivered from the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln President Bush declared
the military phase of the Iraq invasion had ended. In this speech, he stated
that overthrowing Saddam Hussein was “one victory in a war on terror that
began on September 11, 2001, and still goes on.” Id. It was reported that the
Obama Administration would not continue to use the phrase, however it
remains a useful term to describe the period of time in which the respective
governments enacted significant amounts of anti-terrorism and related
legislation. Id.
2. Christopher Dunn, Balancing the Right to Protest in the Aftermath of
September 11, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 327, 327 (2005).
3. See generally Ben Middleton, Rebalancing, Reviewing or Rebranding
the Treatment of Terrorist Suspects: the Counter-Terrorism Review 2011, 2011
J. CRIM. L., 225 (U.K.) (discussing the liberties of those suspected of
terrorism).
4. See generally Adam Tomkins, National Security and the Role of the
Court: A Changed Landscape, 126 LAW Q.REV. 543 (2010) (U.K.) (analyzing
judicial review of national security); AILEEN KAVANAGH, CONSTITUTIONAL
REVIEW UNDER THE U.K. HUMAN RIGHTS ACT (2009) (discussing the Human
Rights Act and important cases brought since its inception).
5. See generally Helen Fenwick, Marginalizing Human Rights: Breach of
the Peace, “Kettling”, the Human Rights Act and Public Protest, 2009 PUB. L.
737 (U.K.) (outlining the law and police efforts in response to mass protest in
455
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discussion will examine the key legal developments, in the USA
and the English legal systems respectively, surrounding individual
protests that have arisen since the attacks of September 11, 2001.
A variety of themes will be examined, from the activities of
peace campaigners camped outside the U.K. parliament, to the
small, but notorious, demonstrations that have occurred at the
funerals of military service personnel.6 The treatment of these
protestors, and the subsequent reaction of the courts, will be
examined as a specific example of how low-level public order and
free expression have an almost symbiotic relationship. The reason
behind this particular field of inquiry is two-fold. The primary
reason is that it is a peculiarly (but not exclusively) “Post 9/11”
phenomenon. Additionally, the extreme content of the protestor’s
message at a funeral makes it “difficult to imagine more
outrageous and provocative speech.”7
Turenne states “[t]he right to freedom of expression is
typically asserted when a person is charged with a public order
offence concerning the manner of a protest and his behavior
during a demonstration.”8 This statement was made in connection
with English public order law, and the role of the courts in
protecting political protest from being suppressed by disorderly
conduct statutes cannot be ignored in any analysis of low-level
public order.9 It is contended, however, that this discussion
benefits from an examination within the context of the United
States. One leading commentator asserts that the courts in the
United States “give particularly strong protection to political
speech,” by virtue of the First Amendment.10 A “conceptual
cornerstone” of the United States Constitution11 is that the courts
can strike down any legislation that interferes with freedom of
speech. The United States’s perspective, therefore, provides the
clearest and most direct restriction upon low-level public order
legislation.

the United Kingdom).
6. See Bill That Restricts Military Funerals Awaits Obama’s Signature,
CNN (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/02/politics/military-funeralsprotests (discussing the actions of protestors that led to the creation of law
restricting protest at funerals).
7. S.R. McAllister, Funeral Picketing Laws and Free Speech, 55 U. KAN.
L. REV. 575, 575 (2007).
8. Sophie Turenne, The Compatibility of Criminal Liability with Freedom
of Expression, 2009 CRIM. L.R. 866, 866 (U.K.).
9. See generally ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 268-311 (2d ed.
2005) (discussing access to public places for speech purposes).
10. Id. at 155.
11. Id. at 2.
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II. WHEN RIGHTS COLLIDE: U.S. AND ENGLISH PERSPECTIVES ON
THE HOSTILE AUDIENCE
There is an inherent tension at the heart of any discussion on
public order law.12 There may be a vehement protestor, whose
protest is dramatic and offensive. For instance, when considering
demonstrations that occur at military funerals, however, many
may be deeply offended by such a protest. The consequence of this
is that the activities of protestors may fall within the ambit of
disorderly conduct offences. Therefore, fundamental to this
discussion is the attitude of the courts when low-level public order
offences are used to suppress, or at least restrict, an individual’s
right to protest in such circumstances.
When considering the balancing act between expression and
order, the problem of the so-called “hostile audience” or “heckler’s
veto”13 raises acute difficulties. In such a case, the exercise of free
speech causes the listener to become agitated and possibly violent.
Such a problem is not unique to the English jurisdiction and is
particularly relevant in a public order arena, where, not the
speaker, but an audience may be committing a public order
offense. In Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement,14 the Supreme
Court of the United States held that to base a statutory restriction
upon the reaction of a listener to the speech is not content-neutral
and any measures to abridge speech, however unpopular it might
be, would be unconstitutional.
The English position is characterized by what has been
referred to as “an unfortunate lack of consistency.”15 The approach
of the court in situations where the audience seeks to use violence
against an inherently peaceful protest can first be found in Beatty
v. Gilbanks.16 The court in Beatty stated that it is the duty of the
police to deal with those using violence rather than persons
exercising their lawful right to protest.17 This orthodoxy held sway
for nearly fifty years but was a marked contrast to the decision of
the Divisional Court in the later case of Duncan v. Jones.18
Despite being decided on slightly different facts, the court in
Duncan held that a protestor could be convicted for doing a lawful
act (i.e., protesting) if they know that doing that act may cause

12. See generally Hammond v. DPP, [2004] EWHC (Admin) 69, (explaining
the tension in the context of the case as it relates to offensive protests).
13. BARENDT, supra note 9, at 300.
14. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992).
15. DAVID MEAD, THE NEW LAW OF PEACEFUL PROTEST 329 (2010).
16. Beatty v. Gilbanks, [1882] 9 Q.B. 308 (Eng.) (discussing the duty of the
police in protest situations).
17. BARENDT, supra note 9, at 303.
18. Duncan v. Jones, [1936] 1 K.B. 218 (Eng.) (discussing the court’s
changing views).
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another to do an unlawful act.19 While the majority of courts have
followed the Duncan reasoning,20 there is a concern that the
definitive legal position has not been sufficiently clear to make an
outcome predictable to any potential protestor.21 The following
critique of two significant protest cases in the post-Human Rights
Act era is illustrative of the ambivalent position held by the courts
in relation to protecting unpopular speech.
III. LOW-LEVEL DISORDER: THE ENGLISH LEGISLATIVE APPROACH
From an English perspective, the operative statutory
provision that will be examined is section 5 of the Public Order Act
1986 which, inter alia, provides that:
A person is guilty of an offence if he—uses threatening, abusive or
insulting words or behaviour or disorderly behaviour, or displays
any writing, sign or other visible representation which is
threatening, abusive or insulting, within sight or hearing of a person
likely to be caused harassment alarm or distress.22

The actus reus of § 5 is that the threatening, abusive or
insulting behavior or disorderly conduct23 of the accused must be
within the sight or hearing of someone likely to be caused
harassment, alarm or distress24 There is no need for the conduct to
be directed at any particular victim but (unlike other more serious
offences under the 1986 Act25) the person who is likely to be
caused harassment, alarm or distress must actually witness the
conduct, even if it is by CCTV26 or on the Internet.27 The mens rea,
19. See Duncan, [1936] 1 K.B. 218 (noting that the violence came from
people who Duncan was trying to stir into political action); MEAD, supra note
15, at 329; see Beatty, [1882] 9 Q.B. 308 (explaining that the clash was
between the Salvation Army and a group who opposed them, the Skeleton
Army.).
20. MEAD, supra note 15, at 329.
21. Id. at 223.
22. Public Order Act, 1986, c. 64, § 5(1) (Eng.).
23. See Brutus v. Cozens, [1972] UKHL 6, [1973] AC 854 (Eng.) (holding
that these words should be given their ordinary meaning, and whether
behaviour had been “insulting” was a question of fact for the finders of fact at
trial to determine).
24. See PETER THORNTON ET AL., THE LAW OF PUBLIC ORDER AND
PROTEST, 36-44 (Oxford University Press, 2010) (discussing further why the
accuser must either be within sight or hearing range of a victim for conviction
purposes).
25. See, e.g., Public Order Act 1986, c. 64, § 3(1) (Eng.) (noting that conduct
to be committed for affray, a more serious crime under the Public Order Act of
1986, must be directed at a person).
26. See DAVID ORMEROD, SMITH & HOGAN CRIMINAL LAW, 1075. (Oxford
University Press, 12th ed. 2008). (discussing the holding Rogers v. DPP,
(1999), unreported 22 July DC).
27. See generally S v. CPS, [2008] EWHC (Admin) 438, [2008] A.C. 46
(Eng.) (discussing how a person seeing a photograph coupled with the
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found in § 6(4) of the 1986 Act, is that the accused must either
intend for his words or behavior to be threatening, abusive or
insulting or intend for his conduct to be disorderly or be aware
that it may be.28 The range of conduct that is prohibited includes
disorderly behavior.
Additional offences, involving the regulation of protest around
Parliament must also be considered.29 The English approach to
managing such low-level disorder is heavily rooted in the criminal
law, but despite the appearance of codification there is, in fact a
hydra of multifarious provisions.30 There is a range of legislative
and common law provisions utilized by police during a protest to
deal with low-level disorder.31 Such analysis will provide insight
into whether the regulation of protest is being unduly influenced
by the “normalization” of emergency laws to deal with issues
specifically arising out of the War on Terror.32
Research into the operation of § 5 of the Public Order Act
1986, initially conducted in the 1990s indicated that, disorderly
conduct provisions were not widely deployed as a means to police
protest.33 The constitutional position within the English legal
system has changed since the time of that research with the
enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, which gives further
effect to the rights articulated in the ECHR. It has been asserted
that, since the enactment of the 1998 Act, the courts in the legal
system of England and Wales are showing an increasing
willingness to give strong protection to a protestor engaging in
political speech.34
IV. DEFENSES TO SECTION 5 OF THE 1986 ACT
A protestor, prosecuted under section 5 of the 1986 Act, would
seek to utilize the defense under section 5(3)(c) of the 1986 Act
claiming that his conduct was reasonable.35 Mead explains that
knowledge that is had been posted on the public internet could be grounds for
distress, harassment or alarm).
28. See DPP v. Clarke, (1991) 94 Cr. App. R. 359 (Eng.) (illustrating
objective and subjective awareness under 5(3) and 6(4) respectively).
29. Serious Organized Crime and Police Act, 2005, c. 15, §§ 132-135 (Eng.).
30. See generally, Public Order Act 1986 (Eng.) (illustrating an example of
the English’s codification of criminal law offenses).
31. See e.g., Regina v. Howell, [1982] Q.B. 416 (Eng.) (illustrating a
commonly utilized multifarious provision in the context of the power to arrest
to prevent a Breach of the Peace).
32. See generally P.A.J. Waddington, Slippery Slopes and Civil Libertarian
Pessimism, 15 POLICING & SOC’Y 353 (2005) (providing a critical discussion of
the issue of the perils of normalization).
33. HOME OFFICE, POLICING LOW-LEVEL DISORDER: POLICE USE OF
SECTION 5 OF THE PUBLIC ORDER ACT 1986, Report, 1995, H.L. 195 (U.K.).
34. BARENDT, supra note 9, at 160.
35. See generally Benn Middleton & Christopher J. Newman, Any Excuse
for Certainty: Examining the Operation of the Defence of ‘Reasonable Excuse,
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“[t]he specific reasonable conduct defence [sic] under both § 4A and
§ 5 ought to mean greater protection for peaceful protest. Surely it
must always be ‘reasonable’ conduct peacefully to exercise a
Convention right”?36
The essence of this defense, in the context of a protest, is that
for the courts to criminalize the prohibited conduct would violate
the defendant’s rights in respect of statutorily guaranteed rights to
free expression.37 This defense is given extra potency when
considered alongside the interpretive duty of the English Courts
under section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998.38
The Human Rights Act 1998 also puts in place a specific
duty39 on all public bodies to act in a way which is compliant with
the rights enshrined in the ECHR. As such, courts and police alike
have to be ever more mindful of the rights provided under Article
10 and Article 11. These Articles incorporate qualifications that
allow the state to restrict the rights of the individual in the
interests of national security, providing the restrictions are
proportionate and necessary in a democratic society.40 The
traditional orthodoxy was that judges were unwilling to interfere
(and in some cases even enquire) where national security issues
are raised by the state.41 The apparent threat to civil liberties
after the commencement of the War on Terror has seen the
English judiciary taking a much more interventionist approach in
respect of anti-terrorism issues.42
In respect of individual protest, and whilst not wishing to
stray into an analysis of particular methods of policing, there is a
need to explore the legal dimension of this dynamic with police
officers being imbued with the same legislative guardianship role
74 J. CRIM. LAW 472 (2010) (discussing possible defenses).
36. MEAD, supra note 15, at 233.
37. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights &
Fundamental Freedoms Art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B4575C9014916D7A/0/Convention_ENG.pdf (stating that “[e]veryone has the right
to freedom of expression” which includes the “freedom to hold opinions and to
receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public
authority” but that the exercise of such freedoms may be subject to restrictions
necessary in a democratic society).
38. See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 3 (U.K.) (providing that primary
and secondary legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is
compatible with the Convention rights, so far as possible, regardless of
contrary authority on the question).
39. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 6 (U.K.).
40. Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42, § 2, sch. 1 (U.K.).
41. See e.g. R v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, Ex parte Hosenball,
[1977] 3 All E.R. 452 (Eng.) (holding that the rules of justice were liable to be
modified where national security was at risk).
42. See generally A Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2004] UKHL 56,
[2005] 2 A.C. 68 (H.L) (appeal taken from from Eng. and Wales)
(demonstrating the apogee of this intervention of the judiciary).
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on Convention rights as the judiciary.43 They are required to make
decisions regarding free expression and liberty within society, but
at the same time expected to remain mindful of their duties to
keep the peace and protect the safety of themselves and members
of the public. It is submitted that the attitude of the courts within
England and Wales in the years following the 9/11 terrorist
attacks has been marked by a certain complicity in this approach.
Whilst judgments have stated an eagerness to promote the rights
of protestors,44 this is rarely at the expense of challenging public
order legislation.45
Much of the popular protest that has occurred in England and
Wales has been focused on the military action in Iraq and the War
on Terror, and it is submitted that the courts in England and
Wales have traditionally acquiesced to the police in matters of
maintaining public order. Within the United States, that cultural
dynamic is reversed and protest is viewed as a fundamental part
of the political process. The First Amendment reflects a “profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open . . .”46 Balanced
against this, however, is the undeniably profound impact that the
terrorist attacks have had upon civil liberties in the U.S.47 This
inquiry will look at the way in which the relationship between
public order and protest with the U.S. has evolved as a result of
the terrorist threat.
V. CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND EXTREME PROTEST
The right to free speech is seen as a central tenet of the
constitutional process by virtue of the aforementioned First
Amendment, which states: “Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.”48
43. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 6 (U.K.).
44. See Laporte, R v. Chief Constable of Gloucestershire, [2006] UKHL 55,
[2007] 2 A.C. 105 (H.L.) [92] (on appeal from Eng. and Wales) (stating that “in
a country which prides itself on the degree of liberty available to all citizens
the law must take this curtailment of her freedom of action seriously.”).
45. See generally Austin v. Comm’r of Police of the Metropolis, [2009]
UKHL 5, [2009] 1 A.C. 564 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng. and Wales)
(dismissing an appeal by claimant who was confined by police for several
hours per crowd control measures undertaken to maintain public order).
46. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
47. Dunn, supra note 2, at 327.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. I. There is a symbiotic relationship between the
First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment, which inter alia requires
states to acknowledge the rights articulated in the Bill of Rights in respect of
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It has been noted that “rarely has such an apparently simple
legal text produced so many problems of interpretation”.49 When
discussing conflicts between free speech and the requirements of
low-level public order, therefore, the role of the higher courts
becomes crucial.50 The history of these higher courts is rich indeed
and too voluminous to be considered at any great length within
this discussion.51 In general, the dominant approach adopted by
the Supreme Court can be categorized as requiring the delineation
of certain categories of speech that are deemed to be protected
according to the subject matter. In addition to content regulation,
there are additional matrices that require examination of the
physical location: where the speech actually occurs and the kind of
regulation that is at issue. Within the protected categories of
speech there is also a hierarchy of speech, whereby the content of
the speech is graded according to its perceived desirability.52
VI. “HONORING THE FALLEN”: PROTEST AND THE RIGHTS OF
MOURNERS
When examining protests within the U.S. context, the
approach that the courts take can be summarized by the following,
“[s]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it
is the essence of self-government.”53 Broadly speaking, when the
court decides that the discussion is a matter of public concern54
then the speech will enjoy the protection of the First Amendment.
Speech on matters of public concern may not be protected if it
constitutes speech that the court has accorded no protection, such
as obscenity or “fighting words.”55 Although First Amendment
protection is undoubtedly a powerful shield for free expression, the
courts have provided a framework whereby those officials seeking
to regulate protests can do so whilst not offending First
Amendment principles. The legislative mechanisms by which
all individuals within that state. This is known as the “Incorporation
Doctrine”.
49. BARENDT, supra note 9, at 48.
50. Richard Delgado, Toward a Legal Realist View of the First Amendment,
113 HARV. L. REV. 778, 795 (2000).
51. See generally ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA
(Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) (detailing further the history
of the higher courts and free speech).
52. BARENDT, supra note 9, at 48.
53. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759
(1985) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)).
54. See U.S. v. Nat’l Treasury Emp. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 461, 466 (1995)
(holding that a citizen-plaintiff’s lectures were protected as comments on
matters of public concern).
55. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (quoting
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942)) (identifying fighting
words as a category of unprotected speech because of their tendency to inflict
injury or incite an immediate breach of the peace).
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protests can be regulated in the U.S. jurisdiction are normally
subject to the discretion of individual cities, districts, and states.
Any concept of regulation within the U.S. jurisdiction must
first be set against the competing notions of content-based and
content-neutral restrictions.56 The First Amendment specifically
addresses Congress, restricting its legislative activity. The
Supreme Court has held that restrictions placed by the
government upon freedom of speech apply to all branches of the
state government by virtue of the Due Process Clause57 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.58 Therefore both state and federal
legislators, judiciary and enforcement officers have to be mindful
of any restrictions upon a protest.
A content-based restriction places limits upon the subject
matter of the protest, proscribing certain statements or images.
Content-neutral restrictions apply to all protestors irrespective of
the topic of their protest and usually refer to the methods or
locations employed by all protestors. Hare gives the following
example: “A law prohibiting all public statements on abortion
would be content-based whereas a statute which penalized all use
of sound amplification equipment within 100 yards of a hospital, is
content-neutral.”59
Content-based restrictions are given more severe judicial
scrutiny than content-neutral ones.60 Where the state wishes to
restrict the content of a protest, in order to overcome the First
Amendment hurdle, the restrictive law or provision is subject to
“strict scrutiny”61 in that it must serve a compelling state interest
and be narrowly tailored to achieve that end.62 The intent of the
legislator or originator of the restriction is not relevant, nor is the
fact that the restriction might be addressing a genuine, unrelated

56. E. Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental
Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 443 (Spring
1996).
57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating “[n]o State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”).
58. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“For present purposes
we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press—which are
protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among
the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process
clause of the 14th Amendment from impairment by the states.”).
59. Ivan Hare, Method and Objectivity in Free Speech Adjudication:
Lessons from America, 54 INT’L. & COMP. L. Q. 49, 51 (2005).
60. Regan v. Time Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984).
61. Elizabeth Craig, Protecting the President from Protest: Using the Secret
Service’s Zone of Protection to Prosecute Protestors, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
665, 684 (2006).
62. Hare, supra note, 59 at 52.
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aim.63
Content-neutrality is only part, although a significant part, of
the matrices that courts use when examining restrictions upon
protests. There are three judicial doctrines which are perhaps the
most pertinent when examining the restrictions that can be placed
upon the regulation of protest by police and local authorities: “the
doctrine of prior restraint, the doctrine governing licensing
schemes of First Amendment activity,” and so-called “time, place,
and manner” restrictions.64 These doctrines are well established,65
and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have placed a new
focus on the restrictions that the state may place upon protest.66
The fear is that heightened judicial deference to terrorism related
concerns might see the judiciary fail to challenge over burdensome
restrictions.67
There exists a heavy presumption against the constitutional
validity of prior restraint.68 The complete banning of protest
activity enjoys the highest level of constitutional protection and to
date the Supreme Court of the United States has never sustained
a prior restraint.69 As previously stated, this tension is never more
apparent than when trying to deal with protests at the funerals of
combat veterans. Such protest tests the limits of state regulation
in light of the First Amendment. The year 2012 saw legislative
action by the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives to try
and mitigate some of the distress caused by funeral protests with
the enactment of the Honoring America’s Veterans and Caring for
Camp Lejeune Families Act of 2012.70 This provision seeks to
prevent any intentional activity that “is not part of such funeral
and that disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order of
such funeral.”71 It amends the federal criminal code and provides
for a restriction upon the time of protest at veterans funeral72 and

63. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 117 (1991).
64. Dunn, supra note 2, at 329.
65. Id.
66. See Waddington, supra note 32, at 353 (commenting on the increased
restrictions on civil liberties after September 11, 2001).
67. Nick Suplina, Crowd Control: The Troubling Mix of First Amendment
Law, Political Demonstrations and Terrorism, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 395, 397
(2005).
68. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
69. Dunn, supra note 2, at 330.
70. Honoring America’s Veterans and Caring for Camp Lejeune Families
Act of 2012, H.R. 1627, 112th Cong. (2012).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 1388(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012).
72. Id. § 1388(a) (declaring that U.S. law prohibits any protest during the
period beginning 120 minutes before and ending 120 minutes after a funeral
service).
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also on the place of the protest.73
The right of an individual to protest and freely express their
opinions has been well protected by the Supreme Court.74 Whilst
the relatively recent Lejuene Families Act is, as of yet, untested
before a U.S. court, it may have a potentially chilling effect upon
protest, despite a clear rationale and purpose behind the provision.
In addition to this latest federal provision, there has been a range
of responses to ‘anti-war’ protest by the American legislators and
judiciary both on a state and federal level after the terrorist
attacks.75 It has been stated that the terrorist attacks highlighted
American vulnerability in a way that had never been done before.
This vulnerability, in turn, saw radical changes to law and policy
within the United States.76 The fear of a terrorist attack provides a
potent counter-interest to that of the right to protest. Whether this
added potency has led to courts in both England and the United
States to adopt a more reactionary position when faced with lowlevel public order convictions will now be considered.77
VII. THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT, PROTEST AND THE WAR ON TERROR
Within the English legal system, one of the more disquieting
developments following the terrorist attacks has been the creation
of “place specific restrictions” upon protest, a phrase used by
Mead78 to describe legal restrictions which criminalize protest in a
specific place or regulate that protest, requiring the protestor to
obtain some form of permit to protest. A protestor who obstructs
the highway, an offence contrary to § 137 Highways Act 1980, is
committing a place-specific protest offence. Arrowsmith v.
Jenkins79 established that such an offence could be shown by
intentional presence on the highway whereby an obstruction was
caused, rather than intent to cause an obstruction. The European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) held, in the case of Patyi v.
Hungary,80 that where a static protest does not cause an

73. Id. § 1388(a)(1)(A) (prohibiting any protest from being less than 300
feet from the service itself).
74. See generally, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971) (discussing
first amendment freedoms and actions that constitute free speech).
75. H.R. 1627, 112th Cong. (2012). It is acknowledged that the activities of
the Westboro Baptist Church (the principle target of this legislation) is not, of
itself, directed against the military activity of the United States. However
there is little doubt that the provision could be deployed against antiwar
protestors and must, therefore, be viewed in the context of a broader post-9/11
statutory response by the U.S. Government.
76. Suplina, supra note 67, at 396.
77. Turenne, supra note 8, at 866.
78. MEAD, supra note 15, at 138.
79. Arrowsmith v. Jenkins, [1963] 2 Q.B. 561 (discussing the
establishment of an offense contrary to § 137 Highways Act 1980).
80. Patyi v. Hungary, Eur. Ct. H.R. 21 (2008) (discussing protest law under
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obstruction,81 then such a protest should be permitted.
One particular static protest that has become a very public
demonstration of opposition to the War on Terror was the
campaign of Brian Haw.82 Haw occupied a part of Parliament
Square opposite the main gates of the Houses of Parliament in
opposition to government policy in Iraq and the general conduct of
the government as regards to countering terrorism. Attempts to
remove Haw by Westminster City Council were unsuccessful.83
The coming into force of §§ 132-138 of the Serious Organized
Crime and Police Act 2005, “specifically curtails the right to
protest within a one kilometer radius of Parliament.”84
Specifically, § 133 of the 2005 Act requires that any person
intending to protest or organize a demonstration in the vicinity of
Parliament must apply to the police for authorization to do so.85 A
dedicated, low-level public order offence of organizing, taking part
in or carrying on a demonstration in a public place in the
designated area if appropriate authorization has not been given
was included within the statute to ensure that Haw could be
arrested and removed86
This statute means that the Commissioner of Police87 may
impose conditions88 that he feels are necessary to prevent
hindrance to the operation of Parliament89 or to prevent serious
disorder.90 These requirements resonate with the terms of the
Public Order Act 1986 in relation to the general statutory

the European Court of Human Rights).
81. See id. (ruling that a gap of 5m allowed pedestrian access and did not
cause an obstruction).
82. See Matthew Taylor, Brian Haw, Veteran Peace Campaigner, Dies Aged
GUARDIAN
(June
19,
2011),
62,
THE
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/jun/19/brian-haw-peace-campaigner-dies
Brian Haw died on the June 19, 2011 of lung cancer, the attempts to evict him
from Parliament Square having been unsuccessful to the end of his life. Id.
The future of the “Peace Camp” and the legislation governing protest around
Parliament is still uncertain. Id. The provisions of the Serious Organized
Crime and Police Act remain in force at the time of writing. Id.
83. See generally Westminster CC v. Haw, [2002] EWHC (QB) 2073 (Eng.).
84. Jon Robbins, Right to Protest: Protesting Too Much?, THE LAW SOCIETY
GAZETTE (Jan. 18, 2007), http://www.bindmans.com/news-and-events/newsarticle/protesting-too-much.
85. Serious Organised Crime and Police Act (SOCPA), 2005, c.15 § 133(1)
(U.K.).
86. Id. §132(1).
87. Id. §134(2).
88. Id. §134(3).
89. Id. This includes hindering any person wishing to enter or leave
Parliament. Id.
90. Id. The conditions must, in the Commissioner’s reasonable opinion, be
necessary to prevent serious public disorder, serious damage to property,
disruption to the life of the community, a security risk in any part of the
designated area or a risk to the safety of members of the public. Id.
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provisions governing protests and assemblies, and both of these
statutory provisions can diminish or neutralize the impact of a
procession or assembly. In order to combat the presence of existing
protestors, including (prior to his death) Brian Haw, a statutory
instrument91 was promulgated to amend the provisions of § 132(1)
to include continuing demonstrations as well as new
demonstrations.92
It was contended in R (Haw) v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department,93 that his demonstration started before the
2005 Act came into force. The High Court held that, as the protest
had been occurring prior the coming into force of the 2005 Act,
there was no requirement for him to obtain the authorization of
the police. The subsequent hearing at the Court of Appeal94
overturned the decision by the High Court and ruled that
Parliament had clearly intended to regulate all demonstrations
within the designated area no matter when they started.95 The
court focused, not upon the protest itself, nor indeed was there any
substantive discussion surrounding freedom of expression.
Instead, the court looked, primarily, at the interpretative issues
surrounding the legislation. Although the scale of his occupation of
Parliament Square was dramatically curtailed,96 Brian Haw’s
protest remained subject to new conditions imposed by the police.97
In Tucker v. DPP,98 Haw’s co-campaigner, Barbara Tucker,
was convicted under § 132 of the 2005 Act for carrying out an
unauthorized protest in Parliament Square. The Administrative
Court rejected her contention that Haw had invited her to join his
protest, and therefore, she did not require additional authority.
Furthermore, the court held that the permit requirements of part

91. Article 4(2) Serious Organized Crime and Police Act 2005
(Commencement No. 1, Transitional and Transitory Provisions) Order (SI
2005 No. 1521 C66).
92. Id. The provision states that “[t]he references in sections 132(1)
(demonstrating without authorisation in a designated area) and 133(2) (notice
of demonstrations in a designated area) of the act to a demonstration starting
are to take effect as if they were references to demonstrations starting or
continuing on or after 1st August 2005.” Id.
93. Regina (Haw) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,
Commissioner for the Metropolitan Police Service, [2005] EWHC (Admin)
2061, [4], [2006] 2 W.L.R. 50 (Eng.) (discussing the fact that the demonstration
predated the 2005 act).
94. Regina (Haw) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2006]
EWCA (Civ) 532, [23], [2006] 3 W.L.R. 40 (Eng.) (overturning the decision by
the High Court).
95. SOCPA § 132 (6).
96. THORNTON, supra at note 24, at 132.
97. Id. The scale of the camp was reduced to three-square meters in size
and many of the posters and placards were removed.
98. Tucker v. DPP, [2007] EWHC (Admin) 3019 [8-9], (Eng.) (discussing
the protest that lead to the conviction).
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four of the 2005 Act were not incompatible with the provisions of
Article 10 and 11 of the ECHR.99 The decision to prosecute Haw
under § 134 of the 2005 Act for breach of the conditions imposed by
the Commissioner was overturned by the Divisional Court in the
case of DPP v. Haw.100 It held that the conditions imposed were
demonstrated to be unworkable101 and, as such, were plainly not
reasonable and did not satisfy the test of certainty required when
considering whether the restrictions on Convention rights were
“according to law.”102
VIII. BLUM: THE DEFINITIVE JUDGMENT
The definitive judgment on the provisions of the Serious
Organized Crime and Police Act 2005 was made in relation to two
separate protests. In Blum v. Director of Public Prosecutions And
Other Appeals,103 the Divisional Court heard consolidated appeals
following the conviction of four protestors for conducting
unauthorized protests. Stephen Blum and Aqil Shaer were part of
a demonstration organized by the “Stop the War Coalition”,
specifically against the provisions of §§ 132-138 of the 2005 Act.
Police deployed these provisions during the protest of Milan Rai
and Maya Evans, which occurred in October 2005. Evans stood
opposite Whitehall and read out the names of all British soldiers
who had been killed in Iraq whilst Rai read out the names of Iraqi
citizens who had died in the conflict. In each case, the
demonstrators knew that authorization would be required, and
were given the opportunity by police to end their protest. Indeed, it
was noted by Waller L.J. that, “the demonstrations were peaceful
and good-humored . . . . The demonstrations were as much as
99. Id. at [8].
100. See DPP v. Haw, [2007] EWHC (Admin) 1931 [1], [2008] 1 W.L.R. 379
(Eng.) (overturning the decision to prosecute Haw).
101. Id. at [14]. The conditions stipulated are as follows:
The site associated with your demonstration (including banners,
placards etc.) will not exceed 3 metres in width, 3 metres in height and 1
metre in depth. The site should at no time prevent pedestrian movement
along the footway. Your property (including banners, placards etc.) must
be supervised at all time with diligence and care, in a manner that
ensures that nothing can be added to your protest site without your
immediate knowledge. You must not use articles in connection with your
demonstration that can conceal or contain other items. You must
maintain your site in a manner that allows any person present to tell at
a glance that no suspicious items are present. If members involved in
your demonstration are to exceed 20 in total you must give six clear
days’ notice to the operations officer at Charing Cross Police Station. If
requested by a police officer in uniform, you must confirm whether
persons present are part of your demonstration or not.
Id.
102. DPP, [2007] EWHC 1931 (Admin) [45].
103. Blum v. DPP, [2006] EWHC (Admin) 3209, [1-4], [2007] A.C.D. 40.
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anything a demonstration against the requirement that
authorization should have been required to demonstrate in
Parliament Square and/or in Whitehall.”104
The four protestors sought to argue, at first instance, that
§ 132 of the 2005 Act was not compatible with Articles 10 and 11 of
the ECHR and, as such, the court should act according to § 3 of the
1998 Act and read down § 132 of the 2005 Act.105 It was also
argued that under § 6(1) of the 1998 Act, it would be unlawful for
the court to convict the appellants.106 In each case, this argument
was rejected, with the court finding that the relevant sections of
the 2005 Act were indeed compliant with the Convention.107 In the
subsequent appeal, the protestors changed tack. They argued that
all public bodies have to justify whether, at each stage of the
criminal process, the decision to arrest, charge and convict was
necessary and proportionate given that in each case the
demonstrations had been both peaceful and good humored.108
The appellants argued that the state, in its various public
authority guises, should have looked not only at the failure to
obtain the requisite authorization, but also at the conduct of the
demonstrators. This line of reasoning was rejected and the appeal
was dismissed. The court held that once it is accepted that the
authorization procedures within the 2005 Act are compatible with
Convention rights, it is not legitimate to ask the court to look at
the unauthorized conduct.109 Similarly, Parliament must be
entitled to impose sanctions for not seeking authorization
otherwise the finding that the sections are compatible is
illusory.110
IX. PROTEST WITHIN THE U.K. AND THE WAR ON TERROR
The dilemma caused by dissenters is not the primary mischief
that § 5 of the 1986 Act was designed to counter.111 It just happens

104. Id. at [9].
105. Id. at [15].
106. Id.
107. See id. at [16] (holding that each of the appellants failed to prove that
§ 1321(1)(a) and (b) were not compliant with Articles 10 and 11 of the
European Convention on Human Rights).
108. Id. at [17].
109. See
Ziliberberg
v.
Moldova,
HUDOC,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-68119
(Jan.
1,
2005) (holding that states do have a right to require authorization for
demonstrations to ensure effective policing).
110. Blum v. DPP, [2006] EWHC (Admin) 3209, [29] (Eng.).
111. See Andrew Geddis, Free Speech Martyrs or Unreasonable Threats to
Social Peace?—“Insulting” Expression and Section 5 of the Public Order Act
1986, 2006 P.L. 853, 873 (U.K.) (indicating that certain expression falls within
the definition of anti-social conduct, as opposed to the provision being strictly
to regulate certain speakers).
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that a particularly vocal demonstrator is able to fall within the
general area of antisocial behavior.112 Even before the events of
September 11, 2001, it was for a police officer to decide that an
essentially peaceful protest falls within the ambit of § 5, due to the
potential for that protest to be threatening, abusive or insulting
and likely to cause harassment, alarm, or distress. That protestor
can then be arrested and her or his participation within that
protest can be ended.113
The breadth of interpretation available to the courts in
relation to these terms provides for a broad range of behavior that
may be prohibited under § 5. In order to express the depth of
feeling, and indeed to make an impact with the protest, it may be
necessary to use language that offends or distresses.114 Sedley L.J.
crystallized this issue when he stated, “[f]ree speech includes not
only the inoffensive but the irritating, the contentious, the
eccentric, the heretical, the unwelcome and the provocative
provided it does not tend to provoke violence. Freedom only to
speak inoffensively is not worth having.”115
It is true to say that such concerns are not limited to the
protests regarding the War on Terror and subsequent military
entanglements.116 When looking at the view taken by the English
courts in matters relating to the rights of protest, the case law
prior to the 9/11 attacks seemed to suggest that political protest
would enjoy the protection of the courts. In Percy v. DPP117, the
group being insulted was comprised of American citizens working
on a U.S. Air Force Base, and the individual was protesting
against the Star Wars Missile Defense program.118 Although the
reasoning in this case represented a very narrow finding by the
Divisional Court, it was nonetheless held that a criminal
conviction was a disproportionate way of dealing with the
circumstances of that case.119
The case of Norwood v. Director of Public Prosecutions120
provided the English courts with a suitable test in respect of
112. Id.
113. A.T.H. SMITH, OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER 116 (1987).
114. See Barry McDonald, Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content
Approach to Protecting the Freedom of Expression, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1347, 1383 (2006) (stating that the reason why First Amendment protection is
so strong in the U.S.A. is to promote rigorous debate).
115. Redmond-Bate v. DPP, [1999] EWHC (Admin) (Eng.).
116. See Geddis, supra note 111, at 864-866 (discussing a case in which § 5
applied to a public protest of same-sex relationships).
117. Percy v. DPP, [2001] EWHC (Admin) 1125 (Eng.).
118. Id. at [2].
119. David Ormerod, Public Order: Appellant Defacing American Flag at
American Air Base—Appellant Convicted of Using Behaviour Likely to Cause
Harassment, Alarm or Distress, 2002 CRIM. L.R. 835, 835 (U.K.).
120. Norwood v. DPP, [2003] EWHC (Admin) 1564 (Eng.) (detailing the
facts of the case).
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distasteful protest. Norwood was convicted under section 31 of the
Crime and Disorder Act 1998121 for the racially aggravated version
of the offence under section 5 of the 1986 Act.122 The appellant had
displayed a poster, containing “Islam out of Britain” and “Protect
the British people” in very large print.123 He also displayed a
reproduction of a photograph of one of the twin towers of the
World Trade Center in flames and a Crescent and Star surrounded
by a prohibition sign.124 Norwood was a member of the British
National Party125 and he contended that his actions were
reasonable and as such protected by the “objective defence of
reasonableness” in section 5(3)(c) of the 1986 Act.126 Auld L.J. held
in Norwood that: “in effect that the appellant’s conduct was
unreasonable, having regard to the clear legitimate aim, of which
[section 5 Public Order Act 1986] was itself a necessary vehicle, to
protect the rights of others and/or to prevent crime and
disorder.”127
X. ABDUL V. DPP: BRITISH FUNERAL PROTEST
A case that provides a mirror image of Norwood is that of
Abdul v. Director of Public Prosecutions.128 The defendant was part
of a group of protesters who had attended a parade to celebrate the
homecoming of British service personnel.129 As part of their
protest, they brandished placards, chanted slogans such as
“British soldiers burn in hell,” and called the soldiers “murderers,
rapists and baby-killers.”130 In turn, they were threatened and
abused by members of the public.131 The protest had been planned
in conjunction with the local police and on the day the protestors
had complied with police directions throughout.132 Furthermore,
they had not been warned about their behavior, nor been asked to
desist.133 The protestors were not arrested at the time of the
protest.134 Instead the decision to prosecute was not taken until

121. Crime and Disorder Act, 1998, c. 37, § 31, (Eng.).
122. Norwood, [2003] EWHC (Admin) 1564 at [40] (Eng.); Public Order Act,
1986, c. 64, § 5, (Eng.); See also DPP v. Johnson, [2008] EWHC (Admin) 509
(Eng.) (providing details on the operation of this offence).
123. Norwood, [2003] EWHC (Admin) 1564 at [6] (Eng.).
124. Id.
125. Id. at [7].
126. Id. at [37].
127. Id. at [40].
128. Abdul v. DPP, [2011] EWHC (Admin) 247, [2011] H.R.L.R. 16 (Eng.)
(detailing a case on British funeral protests).
129. Id. at [12]-[13], [15], [18].
130. Id. at [16].
131. Id. at [19].
132. Id. at [13], [18]-[19].
133. Id. at [19].
134. Id. at [20].
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months later, following the viewing of hours of video footage and
in consultation with the Complex Trial Unit of the Crown
Prosecution Service.135
The court held that the words and behavior of the protestors
in Abdul crossed the threshold of legitimate protest.136 The court
held that the agreement of the police in facilitating the protest and
the conduct of the police on the day of the protests amounted to
neither an unequivocal acceptance that the defendants would not
be prosecuted nor an acceptance that they had been behaving
lawfully.137 Here, the threat of violence that was missing from
Norwood seems to indicate that a central concern of the courts in
such cases is focused around the prevention of public disorder
rather than enabling protestors.138 As Barendt points out, where
the speeches or general behavior are designed to provoke violence
from opponents then prosecution and conviction becomes likely139
even where the protest has initially peaceful aims.140
The decision in Abdul would have been consonant with this if
the arrest had not been some months after the protest had
occurred.141 That the court found the words used by the defendants
were abusive or insulting is not surprising. Similarly, it is entirely
foreseeable that the conduct was within the sight and hearing of
someone who may be caused harassment, alarm, or distress. The
defendants had a point that they felt was legitimate. At trial, one
of the defendants stated that his intention had been to raise
awareness so that politicians should be questioned about their
decisions.142
Even though they had chosen to shout as well as carry their
message on placards, the prosecution relied only upon the
defendant’s verbal conduct.143 After fully cooperating with the
police and responding to all instructions given it is difficult to see
how else the defendants in Abdul could have made their protest.144

135. Id.
136. Id. at [52].
137. Id.
138. THORNTON, supra note 24, at 410.
139. BARENDT, supra note 9, at 303.
140. Duncan v. Jones, [1936] 1 K.B. 218 at 222-224 (Eng.).
141. See generally Abdul, [2011] EWHC (Admin) 247, [2011] H.R.L.R. 16
(Eng.) (detailing a case on British funeral protests).
142. Id. at [21].
143. Id. at [20].
144. Compare id. at [52] (holding “potentially defamatory” and
“inflammatory” remarks go “beyond the legitimate expression of protest”) with
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 414 (1989)) (stating “[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the
First Amendment, it is that the [United States] government may not prohibit
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive
or disagreeable.”).
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The decisions in Norwood145 and Abdul,146 discussed supra,
show that after the 9/11 terrorist attacks the English courts were
prepared to distinguish political opinion from speech that they felt
crossed the boundaries of legitimate protest.147 In many ways
these protestors, although expressing different viewpoints,
illustrated the courts’ intolerance toward those who promulgated
extreme positions about the war on terror. Norwood’s “reasonable
conduct” defense was rejected by the court, which held that § 5
was itself a statute designed to protect the rights of others,
specifically those in the Muslim community.148 In Abdul, the court
held that compliance with the police was not enough to provide
legitimacy for words that fell within the ambit of § 5.149
Individual protest cases, such as Norwood and Abdul,
demonstrate that within England and Wales, regular low-level
public order offenses threaten to dissipate the rights of those who
seek to offer contrary opinions “post 9/11”.150 One of the
fundamental challenges facing the English legal system emanates
from the state’s utilization of existing legislation to suppress
speech and opinions.151 This, of course, is not a problem unique to
issues relating to the actions of terrorist groups and the wider
conduct of the War on Terror by the government.152
The reaction to government policy surrounding the War on
Terror has encouraged individual and collective protest that, at
times, has encompassed the entire range of reactions mentioned by
Sedley L.J. in Redmond-Bate.153 This poses a particular challenge
for the policing of such protest. The Convention imbues the same
principles of legislative guardianship to both police officers and the
judiciary.154 Yet, they are required to make decisions regarding
145. Norwood, [2003] EWHC (Admin) 1564.
146. Abdul, [2011] EWHC (Admin) 247.
147. See id. at [49] (distinguishing “legitimate protest” from speech that
“threat[ens] public order”); Norwood, [2003] EWHC (Admin) 1564 at [34]
(holding that speech “likely to . . . cause[] harassment, alarm or distress” is not
protected speech).
148. Norwood, [2003] EWHC (Admin) 1564 at [40].
149. Abdul, [2011] EWHC (Admin) 247 at [33].
150. See supra text accompanying notes 1-7 (discussing the state’s desire to
restrict speech).
151. Id. (discussing the state’s use of legislation to restrict offensive speech).
152. See, e.g., Dehal v. CPS, [2005] EWHC (Admin) 2154 [9] (balancing an
individual’s right to free expression against another individual’s right not to
be caused harassment, alarm or distress).
153. Redmond-Bate, [1999] EWHC (Admin) 733 at [20] (noting “free speech
includes not only the inoffensive, but the irritating, the contentious, the
eccentric, the heretical, the unwelcome and the provocative provided it does
not tend to provoke violence. Freedom only to speak inoffensively is not worth
having . . . .”).
154. See Human Rights Act, 1998, ch. 42, § 6(2) (Eng.) (defining “public
authority” to include both courts and “any person certain of whose functions
are functions of a public nature . . . .”).
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free expression and liberty within society, whilst at the same time
remaining mindful of their duties to keep the peace and protect
the safety of themselves and members of the public.155
This dilemma is not unique to the English legal system. In
relation to the protection of protest in the U.S., Dunn stated that:
“In reality, a person’s ability to protest has little to do with nine
justices in black robes; it instead is governed by police officers
standing on the street with handcuffs, guns, and only the most
oblique understanding of or interest in legal niceties.”156
This serves to underline at least part of the reason behind
limited amount of judicial consideration given to low-level public
order disputes, and is a problem common across both jurisdictions.
Much of the regular maintenance of public order is done at such a
low level that no real records are kept and a true picture of the
attitudes of those who actually police and administer low-level
public order is simply unattainable.157
XI. FUNERAL PROTESTS IN THE USA: “POST 9/11” PARADIGM SHIFT
The English criminal cases provide an illuminating
comparator to a form of protest that has emerged in the United
States, and in particular, with the recent decision in the case of
Snyder v. Phelps.158 This case, which has attracted considerable
notoriety on both a national and international level, concerned the
activities of the Westboro Baptist Church and the “fire and
brimstone” preaching of First Minister, Fred W. Phelps.159 Phelps
and some of his parishioners (who were, in fact, other family
members) picketed the funeral of Marine Lance Corporal Matthew
Snyder, carrying placards stating “Thank God for Dead Soldiers”,
“Semper Fi, Semper Fags, coming home in body bags” and “God Is
Your Enemy.”160
The protest conformed to local ordinances in respect of
protests at funerals161, and the family of Snyder confirmed that

155. See, e.g., Abdul, [2011] EWHC (Admin) 247 at [49] (describing these
balancing factors).
156. Dunn, supra note 2, at 328-29.
157. This difficulty also bleeds in to the collation of meaningful statistics on
public order arrests, prosecutions and disposals. At the time of writing, there
is no meaningful statistics to compare across the jurisdictions.
158. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
159. See Louis Theroux Returns to America’s Most Hated Family, BBC,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-12924568 (last updated Apr. 4,
2011) (detailing the Westboro Baptist Church and its objectives).
160. McAllister, supra note 7, at 575.
161. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 3, Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (noting that “[t]he police
directed them to a 20- by 25-foot area behind a plastic fence, located on public
land that was 1000 feet from the church. Respondents stood where the police
directed them.”).
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the service was not disrupted. The protest only came to the
attention of Snyder’s father a few weeks after the funeral when, in
searching for his son’s name on the Internet, he came upon a
description of the protest by the Westboro Baptist Church which
expressed the view that Snyder’s family “raised him for the
devil.”162
Snyder’s family filed a civil action alleging, inter alia, tort
claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Supreme
Court, by a majority of eight to one163 overturned the original
finding of liability by a Maryland jury and instead held that First
Amendment provides protection from tort liability for those who
stage a peaceful protest on a matter of public concern near the
funeral of a military service member.164 Chief Justice Roberts
stated:
Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears
of both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict great pain. On
the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the
speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a different course—to protect
even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle
public debate.165

It is, perhaps, unsurprising that, in addition to Honoring
America’s Veterans and Caring for Camp Lejeune Families Act of
2012166 a majority of state legislatures have chosen to enact
statutory provisions that “mute and conceal from mourners’ sight
the protestors and their provocative messages.”167 Many of these
are so called “time, place and manner” restrictions, which create a
buffer zone around the locations of the funeral service.168 Some
states, however, such as Florida have chosen instead to enact
specific criminal sanctions, whereby it will be a crime for a
defendant to willfully interrupt or disturb an assembly of people
meeting for the purpose of acknowledging the death of an
individual who was a member of the armed forces of the United
States.169 The State of Virginia goes one step further and
162. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1226.
163. Id. at 1207 (noting the holding). Roberts, C.J. delivered the opinion of
the Court with Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsberg, Breyer,
Sotomayor and Kagan concurring and Justice Alito dissenting. Id.
164. Id. at 1207.
165. Id. at 1220.
166. Honoring America’s Veterans and Caring for Camp Lejeune Families
Act, H.R.1627, 112th Cong. (2012).
167. See McAllister, supra note 7, at 576 (stating that some forty states
together with the federal government have now “funeral picketing” statutes).
168. The actual concept of buffer zones to enable otherwise offensive speech
to occur is not novel, nor is it a post-9/11 phenomenon. These zones are often
employed to deal with adult bookstores and other such controversial
establishments.
169. FLA. STAT. § 871.01.
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incorporates “disrupting any funeral, memorial service . . . if the
disruption prevents or interferes with the orderly conduct of the
funeral,” into the general disorderly conduct provision.170
Despite these criminal statutes, the decision in Phelps
represents a civil law solution, which may not be pursued within
the other jurisdictions; therefore the focus would switch from the
individual seeking punitive damages to the state seeking to
impose criminal sanctions upon the protestors from the Westboro
Baptist Church. The English legal system has no bespoke
legislation, either in the Public Order Act 1986, or in any other
statutory provision, to deal with disruption at a funeral service.
The power to regulate demonstrations comes from Part 2 of the
Public Order Act 1986, but this only gives punitive powers where
the defendants violate the terms of any conditions imposed by the
police. In the case of Phelps, the protestors clearly complied with
the preemptive restrictions imposed by the police, and they did not
disrupt the funeral so they would not have fallen within the terms
of the Virginian or Florida statutes.
It is almost inconceivable that, had the incident occurred in
England, the protestors in Phelps would have escaped criminal
prosecution under § 5 of the 1986 Act. In considering the
prohibited actus reus elements required for an offence under § 5,
and following the finding of the court in Hammond,171 the words
and visible representations used within the protest may well have
been viewed by the court as being threatening, abusive or
insulting.172 Unless the protest had gone completely unnoticed
then the behavior of the protestors, although away from the main
funeral protest, was still within the presence of someone who is

170. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-415 (discussing disorderly conduct in a public
place). This provision states inter alia that:
a person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with the intent to cause public
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof,
he . . . B). Willfully [sic] or being intoxicated, whether willfully [sic] or
not, and whether such intoxication results from self-administered
alcohol or other drug of whatever nature, disrupts any funeral,
memorial service, or meeting of the governing body of any political
subdivision of this Commonwealth or a division or agency thereof, or of
any school, literary society or place of religious worship, if the disruption
(i) prevents or interferes with the orderly conduct of the funeral,
memorial service, or meeting or (ii) has a direct tendency to cause acts of
violence by the person or persons at whom, individually, the disruption
is directed.
Id.
171. Hammond v. DPP, [2004] EWHC (Admin) 69, (Eng.).
172. See THORNTON, supra note 24, at 115 (stating that under § 5(1) of the
1986 Act there need be only one of the three elements (e.g. the behaviour need
only be threatening, abusive or insulting)); see generally Brutus v. Cozens,
[1972] UKHL 6 (analyzing the test and interpreting the meaning of the above
phrases).

Do Not Delete

2012]

3/12/2013 6:46 PM

A Requiem for Protest

477

liable to be caused harassment, alarm or distress.173 The case of S
v. DPP174 shows that English courts are quite willing to prosecute
using § 4A and § 5 if the conduct is witnessed at all, even if this is
via the Internet some time later. Having established that the
conduct was indeed threatening, abusive or insulting, for an
offence to occur under § 4A, all that would need to be
demonstrated was that Mr. Snyder Sr. had suffered harassment,
alarm or distress for the offence to be complete.175
Undoubtedly, the defendants in Phelps would have tried to
invoke the specific defense under § 5(3)(c) of the 1986 Act and
claim that their behavior was reasonable, probably with reference
to the rights of freedom of thought, conscience and religion under
Article 9 of the ECHR176 and the freedom of expression under
Article 10 of the ECHR.177 This, again, highlights one of the key
difficulties with low-level English public order law. It is likely that
an English court will decide, as they did in Hammond and Abdul,
that the activities of Westboro Baptists go beyond legitimate
protest and uphold a conviction.
That the courts may reach such a decision is troubling from
two perspectives. The first area of concern, as alluded to in
Hammond, is that it may be that there is no effective way in
England for Phelps and his like to express their beliefs, as
distasteful as these beliefs might be.178 A second but wholly
interrelated issue is in respect of the actual difficulties any legal
adviser would face in advising Phelps. It is for the legal adviser to
decide whether to try and persuade the court that the content of
the message was reasonable, or instead focus not upon the
message but instead highlight the reasonableness of the conduct in
delivering the message. This uncertainty reinforces the notion that
low-level public order provisions (especially § 5) in England grants
capricious power to the executive arm of the state. This, in turn,
sees arbitrary decisions being made by the courts based on an adhoc balancing of rights and circumstances instead of having the

173. Holloway v. DPP, [2004] EWHC (Admin) 2621, [5] (Eng.).
174. See generally S v. DPP, [2008] EWHC (Admin) 438 (Eng.) (showing
that English courts willing to prosecute using § 4(A) and § 5).
175. See Public Order Act of 1986 (showing no evidence of violence or threat
of violence is necessary under § 4A or § 5 merely the requirement that the
behaviour causes harassment, alarm or distress).
176. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 37, at Art. 9 (stating that everyone has
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes the
freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or
belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance).
177. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 37.
178. Geddis, supra note 111, at 873.
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requisite certainty that is essential for criminal liability.179
XII. FREE SPEECH ZONES: CONTENT NEUTRAL CONTROVERSY
The importance of the case of Phelps is that it provides an
important illustration as to the way in which low-level public
order issues in America are dealt with in a “post-9/11” legal
landscape. An essential aspect of the defense in Phelps was that
the protest had complied with the preemptive ordinances that
governed protest at funerals.180 The comparison with the English
case of Abdul is clear, in which the protestors complied with police
directions and yet the protest still attracted criminal liability. The
majority of states are content to employ time, place and manner
restrictions to deal with funeral protests. These controls retain a
link to low-level public order in so far as any breach of such a
restriction will likely to result in the individual protestor being
arrested and charged with disorderly conduct.181
Absolutist civil libertarian arguments aside, few people would
object to the restrictions placed on the members of the Westboro
Baptist Church in order to facilitate a peaceful funeral service.
Funerals are not alone in attracting time, place, and manner
restrictions. Perhaps the most controversial and contested of these
restrictions are the so called free speech zones which received
widespread public attention due to their use after September 11,
2001, where the President of the United States, George W. Bush,
had attracted significant domestic criticism for his policies in
relation to the War on Terror.182
Free speech zones have played a prominent role within
academic debate surrounding the chilling effects of government
restrictions resulting from the terrorist attacks. The concept of
free speech zones was actually a product of the student protests of
the 1960s, where student protest was very much a campus-based
phenomenon.183 The case law is, however, relatively recent,

179. See generally, Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, 93 LAW
QUARTERLY REV. 195 (1977), reprinted in Joseph Raz, THE AUTHORITY OF
LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW & MORALITY 210 (1979) (arguing that the making of
particular laws should be guided by open and relatively stable general rules).
The principle that laws should be stable and an individual should be able to
know when he has committed a criminal offence is a recognized element of the
rule of law. Id. Joseph Raz presents perhaps the most celebrated,
contemporary articulation of this notion.
180. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1213 (2011).
181. See generally Freedom Under Fire: Dissent in Post 9/11 America, AM.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, (2003), http://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/dissent_
report.pdf (outlining restrictions to protests in various cities and states
nationwide).
182. Joseph D Herrold, Capturing the Dialogue: Free Speech Zones and the
“Caging” of First Amendment Rights, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 949, 951 (2006).
183. Id. at 956.
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reflecting the wider use of these zones in the aftermath of the War
on Terror. The lawful authority for the establishment of these
zones comes from § 1752 of the U.S. Code,184 which gives the
Secret Service the authority to create restricted access zones
preceding presidential visits.185 Violation of these zones is
punishable by either a fine of not more than $1000 or a period of
imprisonment for not more than a year.186 This puts it within the
realm of other low-level public order offences and yet, as a federal
offence with one-year imprisonment, it is at the more serious end
of the low-level spectrum.
First Amendment doctrinal issues have already been the
subject of analysis187 and this inquiry will now examine these
issues within the context of free speech zones and why they have
the potential to evoke much controversy. The first concern is that
they are actually not concerned with presidential security and
instead they are seeking to keep protestors away from presidential
appearances and photo opportunities188 Coupled with this, it has
been argued that the nature of the restrictions imposed by the
Secret Service very often pose a significant danger to those who
are within the designated zones. In Service Employee International
Union189, it was held by the court that the government had a duty
to protect all persons at political conventions and not merely the
delegates. This duty extended to all protestors.190
Therefore, while the provisions of §1752 have not been found
to be unconstitutional per se, there have been significant limits
placed by the courts as to the nature of the zoning that the Secret
Service can impose. In Stauber v. City of New York,191 it was held
that anything amounting to a caged area (an enclosed pen etc.)
would be an unacceptable imposition or as one commentator
stated, somewhat pejoratively, “[c]ages are a means of
punishment, not a means to regulate the public discourse of a
democratic society.”192
Although the physical limitations are significant, they tie in

184. 18 U.S.C. § 1752 (2012).
185. Craig, supra note 61, at 666.
186. 18 U.S.C.A § 3056 (West 2008).
187. See BARENDT, supra note 9, at 48-55; see also Hare, supra note 59
(discussing the English perspective).
188. Craig, supra note 61, at 660.
189. Serv. Employee Int’l Union v. City of Los Angeles, 114 F. Supp. 2d 966
(C.D. Cal. 2000) (discussing the duty to protect protestors).
190. Herrold, supra note 181, at 963.
191. Stauber v. City of New York, 2004 WL 1593870 (S.D.N.Y. July 16,
2004) amended, 2004 WL 1663600 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2004) (involving a
wheelchair bound demonstrator not being allowed to leave a four-sided
enclosed pen for protestors despite complaining of an illness and the need to
use the restroom).
192. Herrold, supra note 181, at 980.
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with a potentially more sinister aspect of free speech zones. There
appears to be a growing implicit acceptance that protestors
criticizing the government policy during the War on Terror pose a
threat to the security of the President. This, in turn, leads to an
implicit alignment of those who protest with those who pose a
terrorist threat.193 Sitting alongside this, are concerns that,
(despite appearing to be a content-neutral, time, place and manner
restriction) zones that are placed far away from the President
serve, effectively, to silence the communication of protestors.194
An example where the use of protest zones was not upheld is
to be found in the case of Goldhamer v. Nagode.195 The defendants
were holding a peaceful demonstration outside a military
recruitment stand in Chicago. They were handing out leaflets and
speaking to passers-by in opposition to military recruitment.
Officers from the police department formed a line between the
protesters and the booth, and ordered the defendants to move to a
designated zone or be arrested pursuant to city disorderly conduct
ordinance. They refused to do so, insisting that they were
exercising a peaceful protest. They maintained that moving to the
dedicated protest zone would diminish the impact of their protest
and were arrested. Upon appearance at the state court, the
charges against the defendant were dismissed.196
Despite this example of judicial activism in respect of overburdensome regulation of protest, the concerns regarding
restrictions on the grounds of national security remain genuine. As
with the situation in England, as evidenced by Abdul and SSHD v.
Lord Alton of Liverpool,197 the predilection of the higher courts in
respect of low-level protest and public order is to yield to the
persuasive power of the terrorism-prevention arguments of the
state.198 However, as one commentator has pointed out in respect
of America, “[p]ersistent challenges by activist groups have led to
bad law on the books . . . . It is crucial that activist groups realize
for the time being, courts are not a friendly forum for their permitdenial.”199
Given the instability of the law regarding low-level public
order in England, this difficulty is clearly common to both
193. Michael J Hampson, Protesting the President: Free Speech Zones and
the First Amendment, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 245, 253 (2006).
194. Dunn, supra note 2, at 355.
195. Goldhamer v. Nagode, 2008 WL 4866603 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 2008)
(noting a case where the use of protesting zones was not upheld by the court).
196. Id.
197. SSHD v. Lord Alton of Liverpool, [2008] EWCA (Civ) 443, [3] (Eng.)
(concerning the appeal taken by the People’s Mojahadeen Organisation of Iran
(PMOI) to be removed from terrorist organization list pursuant to the
Terrorism Act 2000).
198. Suplina, supra note 66, at 427.
199. Id. at 428.
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jurisdictions, although the protection afforded to speech by the
First Amendment clearly shields protestors in the U.S. to a much
greater degree. As has been established in Abdul and Hammond,
the only way a protestor in England and Wales will find out if his
or her conduct has been reasonable is by a challenge at court, by
which time the chance for protest may have passed.
XIII. BREACH OF THE PEACE: A U.K. “SUI GENERIS” PUBLIC ORDER
PHENOMENON
Thus far, the examination within both jurisdictions has been
limited to the low-level ‘pro-active’ measures designed to ensure
that processions and assemblies can be managed so as to prevent
both serious and low-levels of public disorder. However, these
provide only a partial picture of the way in which public order law
is deployed to ensure that protest does not cross from being the
legitimate airing of a grievance to threatening or actually causing
disorder.
According to A.T.H. Smith, however, at the very center of the
(English) public order law sits the sui generis phenomenon of “the
breach of the peace.”200 Lord Bingham in Laporte201 stated that:
Every constable, and also every citizen, enjoys the power and is
subject to a duty to seek to prevent, by arrest or other action short of
arrest, any breach of the peace occurring in his presence, or any
breach of the peace which (having occurred) is likely to be renewed,
or any breach of the peace which is likely to occur.202

Breach of the peace is woven into the fabric of English public
order law and is the genesis particle of the English legal system’s
approach to regulating low-level criminality.203 It must be
emphasized that this provision is by no means limited to dealing

200. A.T.H. Smith, Protecting Protest—A Constitutional Shift, 66 CLJ 253,
253 (2007) (commenting on R (Laporte), UKHL 55, [2007] 2 A.C. 105).
201. Laporte was a protestor on a coach travelling to an air force base to
protest about military action in Iraq. See generally R (Laporte), [2006] UKHL
55, [2007] 2 A.C. 105, (Bingham L.J.) (discussing the facts of the case). The
police stopped the coach before arriving at the base and found a number of
items such as masks, spray paint and a smoke bomb. Id. at [11]. Additionally,
there was police intelligence that members of an anarchist group called the
“Wombles” were travelling with the group and seeking to radicalize the
demonstration. Id. at [6]. The police concluded that a breach of the peace
would occur when the protestors arrived at the RAF base. Id. Instead of
waiting until a breach of the peace was imminent and arresting the protestors,
the police turned the coaches around and escorted them back to London. Id. at
[12]. Neither Laporte nor her fellow passengers were permitted to leave the
coach until it arrived in London. Id.
202. Id. at [29].
203. See generally Justice of the Peace Act, 1361 34 Edw. 3, c. 1 (exhibiting
the ancient manifestation of the principle that a Justice of the Peace is
assigned power by law over keeping the peace by appropriate action).
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with protest. The case law will demonstrate that it is used in a
wide variety of circumstances and is every bit as protean as the
disorderly conduct provision under § 5 of the 1986 Act yet
deployment of this provision by police does not attract criminal
liability.
The scope and powers of this common law provision has been
visited and revivified numerous times by the judiciary of England
and Wales204 and over the years codification has occurred to such
an extent that breach of the peace has been found to be sufficiently
clear to be accepted as being prescribed by law for the purposes of
the ECHR.205 It should also be noted that the concept of police
action to deal with breaches of the peace have been used within
the Australian legal system as well as the English.206
XIV. LAPORTE: BREACH OF THE PEACE AND PROTEST
In Laporte, the House of Lords concluded that the essence of
breach of the peace was to be found in violence or threatened
violence.207 An arrest to prevent a breach of the peace is not, of
itself, an arrest for a criminal offence,208 merely a preventative
measure designed to remove the individual using or threatening
violence. The most widely accepted definition of what constitutes a
breach of the peace, and the one that is still in current usage, was
elucidated by Watkins L.J. in Howell:
there is a breach of the peace whenever harm is actually done or is
likely to be done to a person or in his presence to his property or a
person is in fear of being so harmed through an assault, an affray, a
riot, unlawful assembly or other disturbance.209

Thornton, extrapolating generic principles from the judgment
of Carswell L.J. in Laporte, has identified three distinct categories
of events where the power to use breach of the peace would be
appropriate.210 The first occasion would be where an individual is
committing or about to commit a breach of the peace.211 The next
204. See, e.g., R (Laporte), [2006] UKHL 55 at [29] (stating the broad duty of
every constable and citizen to prevent any breach by “arrest or other action
short of arrest”); see also R v. Howell (Errol), [1982] Q.B. 416, 426 (Eng.)
(formulating a comprehensive definition of the term “breach of the peace”); see
also Percy v. DPP, [1995] 1 W.L.R. 1382, 1390 (D.C.) (discussing the extent of
justices’ power under the Justice of the Peace Act of 1361).
205. See Steel v. United Kingdom, [1999] 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. 603 [25-29]
(recognizing that the keeping the peace is a principle proscribed by law).
206. See, e.g., Forbutt v. Blake, [1981] 51 FLR 465, 469 (an Australian court
discussing the contours and definition of breach of peace).
207. THORNTON, supra note 24, at 255.
208. Smith, supra note 199, at 253.
209. R. v. Howell, [1982] Q.B. 416 at 427 (Eng.).
210. THORNTON, supra note 24, at 256.
211. See generally Moss v. McLachlan, [1985] 149 JP 167 (finding that
striking miners who are being stopped from travelling to confront working
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set of circumstances would be where individuals are engaged in
lawful activities but are likely to provoke others to commit a
breach of the peace.212
The third of Carswell L.J.’s categories is when a
counterdemonstration is arranged, where a “confluence of
demonstrations, is likely to lead to a breach of the peace.”213 This
situation occurs when a lawful protest and a lawful counter
protest would likely lead to a breach of the peace. In addition to
these three distinct occasions, Howell clarified that action may be
taken to prevent a breach, when a breach is occurring.214
Additionally, action may be taken when a breach has occurred and
there is likely to be a renewal.215 The power to continually detain
an individual is limited to those occasions where the officer has an
objectively reasonable ground for believing that doing so is
necessary to prevent a breach of the peace.216
In Lavin, Lord Diplock identified a wide range of actions
available to police and citizens to deal with a breach or potential
breach of the peace.217 Such actions might include removing an
inflammatory emblem or icon that a person was wearing,218 or
detaining a queue jumper whose activities could provoke a violent
response from others waiting in the queue.219 These activities are
the exact type of low-level public order disturbance that may
escalate into a violent response. Without appropriate lawful
authority, these actions may constitute common assault and
battery, which would violate § 39 of the Criminal Justice Act
1988.220 Authorization of a preemptory power to prevent escalation
miners is a situation where one is committing or about to commit a breach of
the peace).
212. Humphries v. Connor, [1864] 17 I.C.L.R. 1 (Ir.) (finding that wearing
sectarian emblems whilst on a lawful parade through a Catholic area of
Belfast was liable to provoke a violent response).
213. THORNTON, supra note 24, at 256.
214. R. v. Howell, [1982] Q.B. 416 at 427 (Eng.).
215. See Albert v. Lavin, [1982] A.C. 546 (H.L.) 553 (finding that “[i]t is a
question of fact and degree when a restraint has continued for so long that
there must be either a release or an arrest”).
216. Chief Constable of Cleveland Police v. McGrogan, [2002] EWCA (Civ)
86, [17], [2002] All E.R. 144 (Eng.).
217. See generally Lavin, [1982] AC 546 (discussing the many options police
have when dealing with a breach of the peace).
218. Connor, (1864) 17 ICLR 1.
219. See generally Lavin, [1982] AC 546 (finding that Lavin had “reasonable
grounds for believing that a breach of the peace” was imminent when Albert,
appellant, attempted to “jump the queue” at a bus stop).
220. See ORMEROD, supra note 26, at 581-89 (discussing this topic in greater
detail). The actus reus for common law assault and battery, although
statutorily prohibited, is actually found in DPP v. Little and occurs when D
causes V to apprehend or fear that force is about to be used to cause some
degree of personal contact and possible injury. DPP v. Little, [1991] 1 Q.B. 645
(Eng.). The actual infliction of the force is the battery. Id.
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into a violent response, though short of an actual arrest, seems to
be a core requirement of any low-level public order framework.
The flexibility of common law makes this an attractive tool for
police when dealing with actual or apprehended public disorder.221
Any evaluation of the English judicial approach to defending
freedom of expression and popular protest would be classified as
indeterminate. At first sight, the case of Laporte provides “a rare
case for celebration for civil libertarians.”222 Indeed, this should be
doubly so because all parties in Laporte accepted that that
sufficient legislation allowed authorities to ban the demonstration
at Fairford. Yet, the police tried to work within the existing public
order framework to facilitate the protest. This optimism should be
set against the concerns raised in Abdul. In R v. Jones223, Lord
Hoffmann stated that it is the “mark” of a civilized community to
accommodate protest and civil disobedience.224 Yet, that seems
somewhat dissonant when balanced against cases such as Haw,
Blum, Tucker, and Abdul.225
In seeking to establish a conceptual post 9/11 framework
regarding the regulation of protest and low-level public order, it is
tempting to view the government’s legislative attempts as a means
to politicize the policing of protests. It is not novel to accuse a
government of using the police to enforce an unpopular political
agenda, and in England, this has been a constant criticism aimed
at the police’s interpretation of the Public Order Act.226 The
concern is that the legislature’s means is an insidious challenge to
political protests. The principal concern, highlighted throughout
this discussion, is the utilization of seemingly innocuous, low-level
public legislation to suppress legitimate protest.
XV. CONCLUSION: SYSTEMIC INCOMPATIBILITY OR ATTITUDINAL
SHIFT
In advocating more robust defense of freedom of expression,
the research focuses on the protection afforded by the First
Amendment in the U.S.; Phelps has indicated how the U.S.
constitution provides an effective shield from the worst excesses of

221. Richard Card, Public Order Law 21 (2000).
222. Fenwick, supra note 5, at 743.
223. R v. Jones, [2006] UKHL 16, [2006] 1 AC 136 [89].
224. Id. (appeal taken from Eng.) (Lord Hoffmann).
225. See generally id. (discussing key aspects of low-level public order law
that was deployed against protestors). In that case, the law was Criminal
Trespass contrary to Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, § 68, and
the protestors were arguing that the U.K. and U.S.A. were guilty of the crime
of aggression, arguing that their protests were justified under Criminal Law
Act 1977, § 3. See THORNTON, supra note 24, at 326 (giving further details).
226. See ROBERT REINER, THE POLITICS OF THE POLICE (Oxford Univ. Press
3rd ed., 2000).
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overly vague legislation.227 Unfortunately, however desirable it
might be to transplant First Amendment jurisprudence into the
English legal system, there are fundamental differences in the
approaches taken by the two jurisdictions. In Phelps, there was no
criminal prosecution. Instead the court was asked to decide
whether to award damages to the party. Therefore, the whole
thrust of the inquiry was different from a criminal investigation. It
is possible to speculate that a prosecution in an English court,
with similar facts to the case of Phelps, would likely result in
conviction on that grounds that the activity of a funeral disruption
strays beyond legitimate protest.228
Yet, despite the powerful protection afforded to speech within
the U.S. Constitution, it is settled law that the First Amendment
does not grant a protestors the right to protest anywhere they
desire and at any time. The government is entitled to place certain
restrictions regarding the time, place, and manner of any such
protest.229 The American solution is to utilize disorderly conduct
provisions where appropriate, whilst the ‘victims’ of extreme
protest seek redress through the civil courts.230
Intriguingly, one of the key findings of this Article is that it is
the enduring appeal of the preventative powers predating the War
on Terror that provides opportunities for a non-criminal approach
to managing low-level disorder. Simester and Sullivan have
articulated the principle that if some other form of state
intervention that falls short of criminalization may be effective to
regulate disorderly conduct “then that alternative should be
preferred.”231
Within England and Wales, the common law breach of the
peace powers232 have been demonstrated to provide police with a
range of options,233 up to and including arrest. The scope of these
powers may have been both restricted234 and expanded235 in equal
227. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1211.
228. See Abdul, [2011] EWHC 247 (affirming convictions of five appellants
for public order offences because the protest at a parade celebrating the return
of soldiers from war was a legitimate protest).
229. Dunn, supra note 2, at 355.
230. See generally Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (exemplifying the procedural
process in the United States for claims involving extreme protests).
231. ANDREW SIMESTER, G. R. SULLIVAN, J. R. SPENCER & G. J. VIRGO,
SIMESTER AND SULLIVAN’S CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND DOCTRINE 652 (4th
ed., 2010).
232. Howell, [1981] Q.B. 416, [1981] 3 W.L.R. 501 (Eng.).
233. See generally THORNTON, supra note 24, at 254-76 (discussing the
scope of activity).
234. See generally R (Laporte), [2006] UKHL 55, [2007] 2 A.C. 105 (H.L.)
(explaining Lord Bingham’s stance that the court should carefully scrutinize
any prior restraint on freedom of expression).
235. See generally Austin, [2009] UKHL 5, [2009] 1 A.C. 564 (H.L.) (showing
the expansion of the peace powers through police regulated protests).
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measure. Nonetheless, this common law provision has been
accepted236 as satisfying the certainty requirements of Article 7 of
the ECHR and still remains “at the heart of English public order
law.”237 It is contended that the flexibility of breach of the peace,
with the ability to focus on conduct that threatens violence against
people or property or causes people to be fearful that such violence
would occur,238 would achieve the same practical ends as those
often sought by employing § 5 but without the attendant stigma of
criminality attached. This means that a non-criminal alternative
for disorder management is readily available, with the advantage
of significant case law support including approval by the European
Court of Human Rights.239
It has been a constant theme throughout this Article that
provisions to deal with low-level disorder, within England and
Wales, tend to give very broad powers to the police that in turn
can be used to suppress what may be legitimate protest.240 The
findings of this discussion have helped to illustrate that the
regulatory paradigm that predominates in the U.S. (with
attendant civil and criminal sanctions) has much to offer the
management of low-level disorder, especially within the context of
protest. There is no need for the continued existence of § 5 of the
1986 Act, or §§ 132-137 of the 2005 Act to regulate low-level
disorder within England and Wales. The lowest level activity,
which threatens to lead to violence, can be dealt with by the
application of the equally versatile, but noncriminal, common law
power to deal with a breach of the peace. It appears, for the
moment, that the differences in cultural approaches to protest
between the two jurisdictions are pronounced. The attitude of the
English courts is one of tolerance for protest only so far as it does
not infringe the statutory framework; the U.S. jurisdiction
tolerates the statutory framework only as far as it does not
infringe the protest.

236. See Steel v. U.K., [1998] 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. 603, [25-29] (discussing the
acceptance of the common law breach of peace standard).
237. Smith, supra note 199, at 253.
238. See generally Lavin, [1982] A.C. 546 (discussing the flexibility of the
breach of the peace standard).
239. See MEAD, supra note 15, at 57-118 (providing a chapter of discussion
on Strasbourg judgments and admissibility decisions pertaining to protests).
240. Robbins, supra note 84, at 23.

